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1  Introduction 
It is commonly agreed that the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 imposed sub-
stantial additional regulatory cost on publicly traded 
firms in the US. This, however, gives no indication 
of the sign of the welfare effects of SOX. In fact, it 
might well be that the benefits of increased trans-
parency, reliability, and accountability in the corpo-
rate sector altogether outweigh the additional cost 
of compliance. For the time being, the empirical 
literature regarding the market’s reaction to the 
introduction of SOX is still inconclusive (for an 
overview see Coates 2007). Some papers document-
ed effects that are in accordance with the view that, 
overall, the cost of capital should have decreased. 
For instance, Jain, Kim, and Rezaee (2006) showed 
that market liquidity improves after the enactment 
of SOX. Jain and Rezaee (2006), Li, Pincus, and 
Rego (2008), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007) documented positive abnormal returns over 
periods surrounding rulemaking events. 
However, other papers indicated that the net wealth 
effect of SOX might be negative. By comparing stock 
price movements of foreign firms with US-based 
firms, Zhang (2007) deduced that the costs of SOX 
largely outweigh their benefits. Also, Engel, Hayes, 
and Wang (2007) documented negative market 
reactions, which are most pronounced for smaller 
firms. Wintoki (2007) found an effect on firm value, 
although he showed that price reactions depend on 
firm characteristics related to its corporate govern-
ance setup. Litvak (2007) found that cross-listing 
premiums of foreign issuers have declined after the 
introduction of SOX. Evidence quoted by Carney 
(2006) indicated that premiums of D&O insurance 
have increased substantially after the enactment of 
SOX, and he furthermore presented evidence of an 
increasing tendency towards exiting the public mar-
ket in the US (i.e., going private). Kamar, Pinar, and 
Talley (2007) calculated that for smaller listed 
firms, it has become more likely to be sold to private 
investors. 
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Research regarding the impact of SOX on the US 
IPO market is scant. Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 
(2010) showed that the likelihood of undertaking an 
IPO in the US has decreased compared to the likeli-
hood of undertaking the IPO in the UK, and Leon 
(2006) showed that the US has lost its market share 
in global equity offerings. Both papers, however, 
argue that their findings are the result of what com-
panies have to expect to fulfill when being public. In 
this sense, the question of whether the provisions of 
SOX also materialize in the IPO conditions has not 
yet been addressed, at least to our knowledge. We 
think, however, that this is an important issue, as 
SOX claims to improve transparency, reliability, and 
accountability in listed firms. If this is the case, SOX 
should have an impact on information production 
for firms aiming to go public. And corporate practi-
tioners as well as regulators have to understand this 
relationship. 
This paper intends to fill this gap by examining 
whether SOX has had an impact on the pricing of 
IPOs in the US. We approach this issue by looking at 
the direct as well as the indirect costs of going pub-
lic, and this for two reasons: First, if SOX has an 
impact on information quality, this should be re-
flected in the cost of information production, i.e. in 
the direct cost of going public, as was also shown by 
Hanley and Hoberg (2010). 
Second, it is well known that the degree of asym-
metric information among issuers, underwriters, 
and/or investors is believed to be one of the major 
factors in determining underpricing. Ritter and 
Welch (2002: 1807) pointed out that “all theories of 
underpricing based on asymmetric information 
share the prediction that underpricing is positively 
related to the degree of asymmetric information”. In 
fact, in a recent paper, Hanley and Hoberg (2010) 
showed in the context of a word content analysis of 
IPO prospectuses that greater informative content 
results in more accurate pricing, i.e. a reduced offer 
price adjustment, and less underpricing. They ar-
gued that information revelation by issuers can 
serve as a substitute for costly bookbuilding. 
In this paper, we follow a similar approach by focus-
ing on models assuming that institutional investors 
are better informed than underwriters. In these 
models, the degree of asymmetric information im-
pacts the outcome of the bookbuilding process. 
According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), lead 
investment banks underprice IPOs as a reward to 
institutional investors for truthfully revealing their 
private (and costly) information. Hence, the private 
information revealed during the bookbuilding phase 
is only partially integrated into the offer price. Han-
ley (1993) first documented this partial adjustment 
phenomenon, showing that there is a strong positive 
correlation between the offer price adjustment (rela-
tive to the price range in the pre-filing period) and 
the final underpricing. 
Starting from these considerations, we hypothesize 
SOX to have reduced the level of asymmetric infor-
mation between the underwriter and the investor. 
Consequently, the level of underpricing should have 
decreased after the introduction of SOX. Moreover, 
the reduction in underpricing should go along with 
a reduction in the offer price adjustment. 
In order to test our hypotheses, we conduct an em-
pirical analysis of 3,974 US IPOs during the period 
1990 to 2007. With respect to the analysis of the 
direct costs, we restrict this sample to the period 
1998 to 2007, i.e. 1,116 IPOs, as flotation costs are 
not subject to similar extreme and perennial cycles 
to those underpricing is (Kaserer and Kraft 2003). 
One major problem in this paper is how to disen-
tangle the influence coming from the SOX enact-
ment from influences coming from other risk fac-
tors, e.g., the economic downturn experienced dur-
ing the period 2001 to 2003, the increased risk 
premiums in the aftermath of the 9/11 event, etc. 
We address this caveat common to most SOX-
related research (Leuz 2007) by employing a pro-
pensity score matching approach. Although we can-
not rule out that our results are nevertheless affect-
ed by a self-selection bias, our findings seem to be 
pretty stable with respect to several robustness tests 
addressing this issue. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: 
First, we find a statistically highly significant in-
crease in the cost of going public of about 90 basis 
points (bp) of gross proceeds. This increase is al-
most entirely due to an increase in accounting and 
legal fees, while the underwriting fees are almost 
unaffected by SOX. Second, we show that the in-
crease in flotation costs is to a large extent an in-
crease in fixed costs. Specifically, for firms with 
proceeds of up to $100 million, the increase is rela-
tively stable at 0.5 million dollars in the year 2000. 
Hence, SOX has had a substantial impact on flota-
tion costs for small firms, while the effect seems to 
be negligible for larger firms. 
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in the range of 5 to 6 percentage points (pp). This 
effect is substantially stronger than the increase in 
the direct cost of going public. Moreover, we present 
evidence corroborating the perception that the en-
actment of SOX has led to a permanent structural 
break in the underpricing function. Fourth, we find 
the reduction in underpricing to be driven by a re-
duction in the offer price adjustment, which is sup-
porting evidence for the notion that SOX has helped 
to reduce information asymmetries between the 
issuer/underwriter and the investor.  
Fifth, we show that our results are not driven by a 
selection bias due to a changing composition of the 
IPO firms after SOX. For that purpose, we test the 
robustness of our results on the basis of a matched 
sample approach. 
An important implication of our findings is that they 
are in accordance with the view that SOX has had an 
impact on information distribution at the IPO stage. 
By effectively reducing the degree of asymmetric 
information, it might have had a positive impact on 
the corporate cost of capital, even though a part of 
these savings is consumed by a higher direct cost of 
going public. However, we do not deliver an overall 
picture of the impact of SOX, as we do not consider 
the cost of being public here. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly 
discusses the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, while 
section 3 lays down the hypotheses of why SOX 
should have an impact on IPO pricing. In section 4, 
we describe the dataset and section 5 presents the 
results. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and 
gives a conclusion. 
2  Relevant aspects of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The main intention of SOX was to improve trans-
parency in public companies by enhancing disclo-
sure and monitoring requirements, preventing 
gatekeeper failure, and improving risk management 
systems. With this agenda, SOX was the direct re-
sponse to a number of accounting scandals in 2000 
and 2001, with Enron being the most prominent 
example. The Act tries to disengage both legal and 
illegal activities, which prevent the investor from 
proficiently valuing a company. Earnings manage-
ment or window dressing could be mentioned as 
legal activities, while manipulation of accounting 
information or concealment of material information 
could be regarded as illegal activities. 
The rules on financial disclosures require public 
companies – among other things – to inform about 
off-balance-sheet transactions and to provide pro-
forma balance sheets. The enhanced disclosure rules 
should substantially increase publicly available in-
formation and, thus, improve the transparency of 
public companies. The provisions on internal con-
trols (Section 404) require public companies to 
thoroughly disclose risks and to report on their dis-
closure controls and procedures – a burdensome 
requirement, which has been blamed most for con-
suming enormous organizational resources. 
Its widely extended monitoring requirements are 
another focal point of SOX. The Act obliges auditors 
to assess and audit the internal control structures. 
New internal controls are defined by the Act (Sec-
tion 404) and range from internal monitoring sys-
tems of operating performance and internal liabili-
ties to an independent audit committee. The whis-
tleblower regulations of Section 806 are another 
form of monitoring, making executives subject to 
scrutiny by their subordinates. 
SOX also introduces a set of measures to regulate 
gatekeepers in order to enforce its monitoring re-
quirements. Ribstein (2005: 5 et seq.) defined gate-
keepers as “senior executives, independent direc-
tors, large auditing firms, outside lawyers, securities 
analysts, the financial media and debt rating agen-
cies”. The accounting scandals in the early 2000s 
showed that the gatekeepers in place failed to do 
their jobs, often caused by conflicts of interest. As a 
consequence, the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) is a major innovation 
brought about by SOX. The Board is a completely 
new independent institution regulating audit com-
panies and defining audit standards. In order to 
avoid potential conflicts of interest, audit companies 
are prevented from cross-selling services to their 
audited companies. The same is true for investment 
banks that have to separate their research on un-
derwritten companies from the capital markets 
team. By ruling out potential conflicts of interest, 
investors can be assured that gatekeepers provide 
fair assessments of the financial condition of com-
panies going or already being public. In particular, 
the problem of analysts overstating the value of a 
company trying to go public is addressed, and many 
forms of influencing the analysts’ opinion have been 
outlawed by SOX. Overall, the pressure on gate-
keepers to perform a fair and objective job has sub-
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It is, thus, not surprising that Eldrige and Kealy 
(2005) found an average increase in audit fees from 
2003 to 2004 of $2.3 million. Furthermore, they 
found that SOX audit costs increase with size, but 
that the SOX audit unit costs vary inversely with 
size, which indicates that large companies are able 
to benefit from economies of scale. Carney (2006) 
found the increase of accounting and legal fees to be 
62 percent on average since January, 2004. 
3  SOX and the cost of going public 
3.1  Direct costs of going public 
Ritter (1987) and Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao 
(1996) separated the total costs of going public into 
direct costs (underwriting fee plus other expenses 
related to the offering) and indirect costs (under-
pricing). The most important direct cost component 
in an IPO is the underwriting fee (also called gross 
spread), which the issuer has to pay to the under-
writing syndicate. Chen and Ritter (2000) docu-
mented a pronounced clustering of underwriting 
fees at 7 percent, leading them to coin this phenom-
enon as the “7-percent rule”. In other markets, how-
ever, clustering seems to be less present, as has been 
documented by Torstila (2003) or Kaserer and Kraft 
(2003). Hansen (2001) examined the question of 
whether this 7-percent rule is the result of collusion 
among underwriters. The author did not find sup-
porting evidence in favor of the collusion theory. In 
contrast, he suggested the 7-percent contract to be 
“an efficient innovation that better suits the IPO”, 
while competition would rather take place on repu-
tation, placement service, and underpricing. 
The ex-ante expected net effect of SOX on the un-
derwriting fee seems ambiguous. On one side, it 
could be argued that having to make a firm SOX-
compliant is a challenge that affects the services 
offered by the underwriter and, therefore, makes 
them costlier. On the other side, however, legal re-
sponsibility is shared among more players after 
SOX, and the degree of asymmetric information 
between the issuer and the underwriter may be 
reduced as well, which should have a mitigating 
impact on underwriting fees. In fact, Kaserer and 
Kraft (2003) documented that underwriting fees 
increase monotonically with the degree of complexi-
ty in an IPO, and that underwriting fees are signifi-
cantly lower for less volatile stocks. Overall, we do 
not have a clear prediction of the impact of SOX on 
the net effect on the underwriting fees. Regarding 
the findings of Hansen (2001), it is also likely that 
underwriter fees remain completely unchanged. 
The remaining direct costs include other non-
underwriting fees like all remaining costs related to 
the offering such as exchange listing and SEC regis-
tration fees, printing and marketing expenses and 
accounting and legal fees. The introduction of SOX 
should have affected these cost components in at 
least two ways: higher compliance costs in general 
and additional costs associated with the implemen-
tation of SOX. Compliance costs primarily result 
from additional disclosure and monitoring require-
ments. Accounting and legal fees are expected to 
increase substantially as the responsibilities of audit 
companies have been widely extended. Retaining 
work papers and peer reviews for seven years and 
auditing the internal monitoring systems of public 
companies are just a few of the additional responsi-
bilities of auditors. Furthermore, audit companies 
face additional costs for funding the Public Compa-
ny Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and annu-
al quality reviews, which they pass on to their cli-
ents. Changing auditors every five years is another 
costly requirement. Although most of these cost 
items tend to increase the firm’s cost of being public, 
they will most likely also have an impact on the cost 
of going public, as on that occasion auditing mecha-
nisms have to be implemented for the first time. 
Overall, we would therefore expect the non-
underwriting direct costs of going public to have 
increased in the after-SOX era. 
3.2  Indirect costs of going public 
As already pointed out, the main reason why SOX is 
expected to have a dampening impact on the degree 
of asymmetric information is because of its goal of 
improving transparency in public companies, pre-
venting gatekeeper failure, and improving risk man-
agement systems.  
Therefore, we expect the introduction of SOX to 
have increased the amount and quality of publicly 
available information at the IPO stage, which is 
r e l e v a n t  t o  b o t h  u n d e r w r i t e r s  a n d  i n v e s t o r s .  A s  a  
consequence, the degree of asymmetric information 
should have been reduced, and this should have an 
impact on underpricing. In fact, according to the 
literature, the degree of asymmetric information 
among issuers, underwriters, and/or investors is 
believed to be one of the major factors in determin-
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nent empirical evidence in this regard was present-
ed, among others, by Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1989), Ang and Brau (2002), and Hanley and 
Hoberg (2010). 
However, the channel by which asymmetric infor-
mation impacts underpricing varies among different 
models. Some of these models build on the fact that 
underwriters are better informed than issuers (e.g., 
Baron 1982, Loughran and Ritter 2002), while oth-
ers start from the presumption that the issuer is 
better informed about the true state of the firm than 
the investor (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber 1989, 
Grinblatt and Hwang 1989, Welch 1989). Finally, 
and most importantly in the context of this paper, 
there are several models assuming that institutional 
investors are better informed than underwriters 
(e.g., Benveniste and Spindt 1989, Benveniste and 
Wilhelm 1990, Spatt and Srivastava 1991). In these 
models, the degree of asymmetric information im-
pacts the outcome of the bookbuilding process. 
According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), lead 
investment banks underprice IPOs as a reward to 
investors for truthfully revealing their private (and 
costly) information. Hence, the private information 
revealed during the bookbuilding phase is only par-
tially integrated into the offer price. While the de-
gree of partial adjustment generally depends on the 
bargaining power of the institutional investor, it is 
an important prediction within these models that 
underpricing is positively related to the value of the 
institutional investor’s private information (Benven-
iste and Spindt 1989 and Sherman and Titman 
2002), which in turn depends on the degree of 
asymmetric information between the bookrunner 
and the investor. Hanley (1993) first documented 
this partial adjustment phenomenon, which is char-
acterized by a strong positive correlation between 
the offer price adjustment and the final underpric-
ing. More recent evidence can be found in 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), Lowry and Schwert 
(2002), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Benveniste, 
Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003), and Lowry and 
Schwert (2004). Cornelli and Goldreich (2003: 
1415) found pertinent evidence “for the view that 
bookbuilding is designed to extract information 
from investors”. 
One important prediction in these models is that the 
degree of underpricing is related to the value of 
private information of those institutional investors 
participating in the bookbuilding process. If there 
were no information asymmetries between the dif-
ferent participating investors, there would be no 
necessity to underprice an issue. Hence, underpric-
ing reflects a cost of capital component due to the 
presence of asymmetric information. As a conse-
quence, if a firm or the regulator was able to reduce 
the degree of asymmetric information, a decrease 
(increase) in underpricing (the cost of capital) 
would result. This is the starting point of our hy-
pothesis predicting that SOX should dampen un-
derpricing, as we expect SOX to have an impact on 
the degree of asymmetric information on the stock 
market. 
Interesting evidence supporting these models was 
added in a recent paper by Hanley and Hoberg 
(2010). In the context of a word content analysis of 
IPO prospectuses, they showed that greater in-
formative content results in a reduced offer price 
adjustment and less underpricing. They argued that 
information revelation by issuers reduces the need 
for information generated during bookbuilding and, 
hence, makes bookbuilding less costly. 
However, the above-mentioned models generate a 
second prediction as the channel via which reduced 
information asymmetry influences underpricing is 
the way in which the bookbuilding range is fixed. If 
SOX alleviates the information advantage of institu-
tional investors participating in the bookbuilding, 
there should be less necessity for (partially) adjust-
ing the offer price range during the bookbuilding 
phase. As a consequence, the difference between the 
final offer price and the midpoint of the initial (pre-
filing) bookbuilding range should be smaller, i.e. 
SOX should have a dampening impact on the partial 
adjustment phenomenon. 
As a final remark, it should be noted that SOX could 
also have an impact on underpricing via its impact 
on litigation risk. The pertinent literature shows that 
ex-ante litigation risk is positively related to under-
pricing (e.g., Lowry and Shu 2002, Tiniç 1988). 
However, the predictions coming from this strand of 
literature with respect to the impact of SOX are 
ambiguous, as it is not clear whether ex-ante litiga-
tion risk has increased. 
4  Data 
Our database integrates data from SDC and 
Datastream and covers an 18-year period from Jan-
uary, 1990 to December, 2007. We eliminate all 
financial and real estate companies, foreign issuers, 
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than five dollars. We exclude one observation where 
the underpricing seems extraordinarily high, and we 
were not able to verify the values reported in SDC. 
This leaves a total of 3,974 bookbuilding IPOs in-
cluding unit and tranche offerings. As we do not 
have all information available for each observation, 
the numbers of observations included into various 
analyses vary. 
Most of the company-specific data come from 
Thomson’s Securities Data Company’s (SDC) New 
Issues database: Offer price, first trading day closing 
price, proceeds raised, number of primary and sec-
ondary shares issued, and all data concerning the 
bookbuilding process such as range prices and 
range revisions. The numbers from Thomson are 
cross-checked with general IPO data provided by 
the NASDAQ website which provides information 
about all IPOs taking place in the US. Information 
on stock market returns and indices are taken from 
Datastream. The information on underwriting fees 
and other expenses such as legal and accounting 
fees are hand-collected from the registration state-
ment S1 as filed with the SEC. 
All monetary values are stated in dollars and con-
verted to purchasing prices of the year 2000 using 
the CPI (CPI=100 in 2000) in order to control for 
inflation. Underpricing is defined as the first trading 
day return, i.e. the return from buying the stock at 
the offer price and selling at the first trading day 
price. The offer price adjustment is calculated as the 
relative difference between the offer price and the 
midpoint of the initially (pre-filing period) filed 
bookbuilding range. The data on company founding 
dates come from the Field-Ritter dataset of compa-
ny founding dates. The age of a company is denoted 
in years and calculated as the difference between the 
founding and issuing date. To rank each underwrit-
er, we use Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures 
of Carter and Manaster’s (1990) underwriter quali-
ty. Ranks range from zero to nine, with higher ranks 
representing higher-quality underwriters. For the 
empirical analysis, we use a reputation dummy, 
which is coded 1 in case of a rank of at least 8, and 0 
otherwise. Loughran and Ritter (2004) used a simi-
lar measure for controlling for underwriter reputa-
tion in their regression analysis of underpricing. We 
have also run the regression analysis with the actual 
reputation values or with a separate dummy for 
each rank. Similar results regarding the coefficient 
of the SOX dummy variable are delivered. However, 
in the first case, the explanatory power of the model 
decreases slightly. 
Overhang is defined as pre-IPO shares retained 
divided by shares issued in the IPO. Firms with 
greater overhang suffer less dilution, meaning the 
costs of underpricing are lower and the level of un-
derpricing is likely to be greater (Bradley and Jor-
dan 2002). 
Moreover, we classify firms into several industry 
groupings. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to 
the high-tech industry are classified as technology 
firms. Firms that are furthermore defined as provid-
ing “Internet Software and Services” are classified as 
Internet firms. 
Finally, it should be noted that we perform the anal-
ysis of the change in the direct cost of going public 
on a reduced sample, i.e. the subsample of all IPOs 
taking place during the period 1998 to 2007. Ideally, 
when analyzing the impact of a given regulatory 
action, a relatively short pre- and post-action period 
should be considered in order to prevent other 
structural breaks to have an impact on the results. A 
period of ±5 years covering a total of 1,116 IPOs 
might be acceptable in this regard. However, as far 
as the analysis of the underpricing is concerned, IPO 
market cycles have to be taken into account. In or-
der to include hot and cold IPO markets in the pre- 
as well as in the post-action period, we decided to 
extend the event period back to the year 1990. 
5  Empirical results 
5.1  Analysis of the direct costs 
5.1.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the subsam-
ple used for the analysis of direct costs. On average, 
a company going public during the period 1998 to 
2007 had to pay 9.28 percent of its gross proceeds 
for underwriting and non-underwriting fees. The 
major part of the total direct costs (6.84 percent) is 
paid to the underwriting syndicate. The mean non-
underwriting expenses are equal to 2.43 percent, 
with accounting and legal fees making up 65 percent 
of all non-underwriting expenses. The median IPO 
incurs costs of 8.96 percent. The median underwrit-
ing fees are exactly 7 percent; in almost 80 percent 
of all issues the underwriting fee was exactly equal 
to this figure. The median non-underwriting ex-
penses are lower than the average ones, summing 
up to 2.00 percent. BuR - Business Research 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 1998 – 2007 
Mean Std. Dev. Median
Number of observations 1116
Total Direct Costs 9.28% 2.18% 8.96%
Underwriting fees 6.84% 0.58% 7.00%
Non-underwriting fees 2.44% 1.95% 2.00%
Accounting & legal fees 1.55% 1.27% 1.23%
Gross Proceeds (2000 $mil) 147.0 400.7 73.5
Assets before IPO (2000 $mil) 441.1 2067.7 64.4
Ratio of Primary Shares 90.6% 21.3% 100.0%
Age of Company (years) 15.0 22.1 7.0
% NASDAQ IPOs 82.1%
% Venture-capital-backed IPOs 55.6%
% IPOs of Technology Firms 39.2%
 
 
Notes: Data are collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum data-
base. All cost items are expressed as a percentage of gross pro-
ceeds. Both gross proceeds and assets are adjusted to purchasing 
prices of 2000 and denoted in millions of dollars. The period 
before SOX includes IPOs between 1998 and 2002. The period 
after SOX includes IPOs between 2003 and 2007. Ratio of pri-
mary shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares 
issued. Age of the IPO firm is the difference between the founding 
and issuing dates, denoted in years. Percentage of venture-
capital-backed equals the percentage of IPOs that were backed 
by venture capitalists before the IPO. Firms that SDC defines as 
belonging to a high-tech industry are classified as technology 
firms. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the pre-
SOX (Panel B) and post-SOX (Panel A) periods. 
Panel C reports the percentage changes in means 
and medians as well as their statistical significance. 
Remarkably, almost all variables are significantly 
different between the pre- and post SOX-period. 
According to our sample, the total direct costs have 
on average increased by a statistically significant, 
but economically rather moderate 33 bp to 9.51 
percent of gross proceeds. Meanwhile, the fees paid 
to the underwriting syndicate are equal to 7.00 per-
cent in the median both before and after the intro-
duction of SOX. On average, we report a significant 
reduction in underwriting fees of 12 bp. However, as 
the median IPO has been significantly larger after 
the introduction of SOX, the findings might be 
simply driven by scale effects inherent in the un-
derwriting fees. Mean non-underwriting fees, which 
comprise all other expenses related to the offering, 
have increased by 46 bp or about 20 percent; there 
has been a similar increase in the median. The in-
crease in accounting and legal fees, which are a part 
of the non-underwriting fees, is even stronger. Here 
the increase ranges between 51 and 41 bp or 35 per-
cent and 37 percent, respectively, depending on 
whether one looks at the mean or median. The firm-
specific characteristics have changed even more 
dramatically. While the median (average) gross 
proceeds have increased by 23.08 percent (+2.95 
percent) to $69.39 ($149.95) million, median (aver-
age) assets before the IPO more than doubled 
(+24.11 percent). The median (average) company 
age has increased by exactly 50 percent (+76.00 
percent) from six to nine (21.2) years. The market 
share of NASDAQ venture-capital-backed IPOs and 
high-technology firms has decreased significantly 
after the introduction of SOX, which indicates that 
the composition of the IPO market has been 
changed substantially by the introduction of SOX. 
These findings furthermore suggest that the degree 
of risk inherent in the IPO market has strongly de-
clined in the aftermath of SOX. Apparently, small 
and rather risky companies tend to refrain from 
going public. 
5.1.2  Modeling the direct costs of going public 
In order to isolate the impact of SOX on the results 
reported in the preceding subsection, we set up a 
linear regression model. From previous literature, it 
is known that gross proceeds are the most powerful 
determinant of the direct costs of going public (Al-
tinkiliç and Hansen 2000, Kaserer and Kraft 2003, 
Torstila 2003). There are several suggestions about 
the functional form in which proceeds should be 
used to explain the direct costs. Torstila (2003) used 
the natural logarithm of gross proceeds in order to 
explain scale effects of the offering size on the un-
derwriting fees. In contrast, Kaserer and Kraft 
(2003) applied a quadratic cost function on a simi-
lar problem in order to capture the fixed-cost effect 
in the direct cost function. However, these ap-
proaches focus on the analysis of the underwriting 
fees, while in this paper we look also at non-
underwriting fees. Thus, in order to identify the 
most appropriate cost function, we initially run 
simple linear regression models with gross proceeds 
as the only explanatory variable. Table 3 reports the 
results of these regressions in terms of R2 and F-
statistics. It can be seen that the most powerful 
specification is the quadratic cost function as pro-
posed by Kaserer and Kraft (2003). Here, however, 
multicollinearity might come up as an issue. There-
fore, we will use gross proceeds as an explanatory 
variable for the underwriting fees, and the inverse of 
gross proceeds for all other cost items. According to 
Table 3, we do not lose much explanatory power by 
doing so, but we eliminate any multicollinearity 
issue from our analysis. In fact, all VIF factors are 
lower than 5 in our analysis. BuR - Business Research 
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Table 2: Comparison of the pre- and post-SOX periods 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Number of observations
Total Direct Costs 9.51% 9.16% 9.18% 8.88% 3.60% *** 3.16% ***
Underwriting fees 6.76% 7.00% 6.88% 7.00% -1.87% *** 0.00%
Non-underwriting fees 2.75% 2.24% 2.29% 1.89% 20.02% *** 18.77% ***
Accounting & legal fees 1.90% 1.54% 1.39% 1.13% 36.94% *** 35.75% ***
Gross Proceeds (2000 $mil) 149.9 85.4 145.7 69.4 2.95% *** 23.08% ***
Assets before IPO (2000 $mil) 508.5 118.2 409.7 51.8 24.11% *** 128.20% ***
Ratio of Primary Shares 84.0% 100.0% 93.7% 100.0% -10.3% *** 0.0%
Age of Company (years) 21.2 9.0 12.1 6.0 76.0% *** 50.0% ***
% NASDAQ IPOs ***
% Venture-capital-backed IPOs ***
% IPOs of Technology Firms ***
Panel A Panel B Panel C







Notes: Data are collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum database. All cost items are expressed as a percentage of gross proceeds. Both 
gross proceeds and assets are adjusted to purchasing prices of 2000 and denoted in millions of dollars. The period before SOX includes 
IPOs between 1998 and 2002. The period after SOX includes IPOs between 2003 and 2007. Ratio of primary shares denotes the ratio of 
primary shares to all shares emitted. Age of the IPO firm is the difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. 
Percentage NASDAQ resp. percentage venture-capital-backed equals the percent of IPOs that were listed at NASDAQ resp. backed by 
venture capitalists before the IPO. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a high-tech industry are classified as technology firms. Per-
centage IPOs of Technology Firms gives the percentage of these firms in the sample. A two sample Gauss test is used here to examine 
whether the mean results are statistically significantly different from each other. The difference of medians is tested by using the Mann-
Whitney test. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
 
Table 3: Choosing a functional form of gross 
proceeds explaining the direct costs and its 
components 








xx 4 6 . 6 % 7 1 . 6
x 5.0% 10.5
x 50.5% 244.4
x2 4 . 3 % 1 9 0 . 5
xx 5 0 . 5 % 4 9 4 . 1
x 4.8% 10.6
x 36.1% 185.3
x2 0 . 4 % 2 0 3 . 6












Notes: Data are collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum data-
base. P* represent the gross proceeds that are adjusted to the 
purchasing prices of 2000 and denoted in millions of dollars. The 
results are based on estimates of a simple linear regression with 
the direct costs or a cost component as the dependent variable. 
All costs are expressed in percent of gross proceeds. The regres-
sion model includes a constant and the independent variable P* 
in a functional form as indicated on the table. The F-statistic is 
based on standard errors corrected by White’s (1980) method in 
order to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
Furthermore, we include the following control vari-
ables. As an additional measure of IPO size, we use 
the assets of the company before the IPO in millions 
of dollars and adjusted to purchasing prices of 
2000. In line with suggestions in the literature, we 
also use the ratio of primary shares to all shares 
issued as an additional explanatory variable (e.g., 
Altinkiliç and Hansen 2000, Kaserer and Kraft 
2003). In order to see impact on costs, we further-
more integrate the age of the company going public. 
For the same purpose, we include a dummy variable 
indicating high-technology IPOs. We also introduce 
a dummy variable for the NASDAQ exchange to 
determine whether the listing venue affects the costs 
of going public. Furthermore, we employ two addi-
tional dummy variables for underwriter reputation BuR - Business Research 
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and venture-backed IPOs to determine whether IPO 
stakeholders influence the direct costs of an IPO. 
Finally, SOX is a dummy variable set to 1 if the IPO 
took place between 2003 and 2007. 
Table 4 documents the OLS estimation results 
where total direct flotation costs (Panel A), under-
writing fees (Panel B), non-underwriting fees (Panel 
C), as well as accounting and legal fees (Panel D) are 
used as the dependent variables. Due to the pres-
ence of heteroskedasticity, we apply White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors meth-
od for the variance of the least-squares estimator 
and calculate the t-statistics for the coefficients ac-
cordingly. It is worth noting that the model has high 
explanatory power, as in all cases the R2 is between 
45 percent and 61 percent. 
The regression model in Panel A of Table 4 gives the 
results with respect to total direct costs. As the most 
important finding in the context of this paper, we 
note that the SOX dummy documents a highly sig-
nificant increase in costs of 89 bp. As expected, the 
inverse of gross proceeds is the most powerful ex-
planatory variable in the model. 
Table 4: Basic regression analysis of total direct costs 
Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF
Intercept 0.065 *** 0.067 *** 0.001 0.001
19.8 50.5 0.3 0.2
IPO Proceeds -8.8E-06 *** 5.3
-4.2
1 / (IPO Proceeds) 1.274 *** 1.5 1.180 *** 1.5 0.647 *** 1.5
14.0 14.4 12.6
Assets before IPO -1.5E-06 *** 1.2 2.1E-07 5.2 -1.9E-07 1.2 -1.7E-07 1.2
-3.6 0.4 -1.5 -1.5
LN(AGE) -0.001 ** 1.3 -2.3E-04 1.3 -0.001 * 1.3 -0.001 ** 1.3
-2.1 -1.3 -1.8 -2.2
Ratio of Primary Shares 0.009 *** 1.2 0.001 1.3 0.007 *** 1.2 0.005 *** 1.2
4.3 0.5 4.7 4.5
NASDAQ (dummy) 2.4E-04 1.6 0.003 *** 1.5 -0.002 * 1.6 0.000 1.6
0.2 5.6 -1.9 -0.2
Technology firm (dummy) 0.000 1.2 4.4E-04 ** 1.2 0.000 1.2 0.000 1.2
0.0 2.0 -0.5 -0.3
Venture-backing (dummy) -0.002 1.4 0.001 ** 1.4 -0.002 ** 1.4 -0.001 * 1.4
-1.6 2.1 -2.2 -1.8
Underwriter rank (dummy) 0.001 1.3 -0.001 *** 1.1 0.001 1.3 0.001 1.3
0.9 -3.1 1.0 0.8
Transition-year (dummy) 0.007 *** 1.1 0.002 *** 1.1 0.005 *** 1.1 0.004 *** 1.1
4.2 3.5 3.2 3.4
SOX (dummy) 0.009 *** 1.2 -3.4E-04 1.2 0.009 *** 1.2 0.008 *** 1.2
8.7 -1.0 9.1 11.5
F-statistic 53.5 24.3 46.6 40.2
R-squared 0.605 0.495 0.560 0.454
Condition Index 20.8 20.2 20.8 20.8
Number of observations 1116 1116 1116 1116
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D






Notes: Data are collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum database. The sample consists of 1,116 firms that went public between 1998 
and 2007. IPO proceeds equal the amount of money raised in the IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 millions of dollars. Assets before 
the IPO equal the total assets of the firm before the IPO, in year 2000 millions of dollars. Age of the IPO firm is the difference between 
the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. Ratio of primary shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares issued. 
NASDAQ is a dummy variable indicating IPOs that went public on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Firms that SDC defines as belonging 
to a high-technology industry are classified as technology firms. Underwriter rank is a measure of the quality of the underwriter, with 
the minimum rank being zero and the maximum being nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures of the Carter and 
Manaster rankings. Transition-year is a dummy variable set to 1 in case of the IPO taking place in 2002. SOX is a dummy variable set 
to 1 in case of the IPO taking place after 2002. White heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are shown in italics. ***, **, * denote signifi-
cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. Condition Index states the highest number of the respective index. BuR - Business Research 
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Table 5: Basic and matched sample regression analysis of non-underwriting fees and ac-
counting and legal fees 
Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF
Intercept 0.006 ** 0.003 0.005 ** 0.001
2.1 0.9 2.3 0.6
1 / (IPO Proceeds) 1.017 *** 1.7 0.944 *** 2.1 0.5049504 *** 1.7 0.4823226 *** 2.1
11.6 13.7 14.0 11.35
Assets before IPO 0.000 ** 1.2 0.000 ** 1.3 0.000 ** 1.2 0.000 ** 1.3
-2.2 -2.290 -2.2 -2.4
LN(AGE) -9.5E-04 * 1.3 3.5E-04 1.4 -8.8E-04 ** 1.3 1.1E-04 1.4
-1.7 0.6 -2.1 0.3
Ratio of Primary Shares 0.005 *** 1.2 5.0E-03 *** 1.2 0.004 *** 1.2 0.003 *** 1.2
3.9 3.3 3.6 2.8
NASDAQ (dummy) -0.004 *** 1.7 -0.004 *** 1.8 -0.002 1.7 -0.001 1.8
-3.0 -2.7 -1.6 -0.9
Technology firm (dummy) 2.8E-04 1.2 0.001 1.3 0.000 1.2 0.001 1.3
0.4 0.9 0.8 1.8
Venture-backing (dummy) -0.003 *** 1.4 -1.7E-03 1.5 -0.002 *** 1.4 -0.001 1.5
-3.2 -1.4 -2.9 -1.1
Underwriter rank (dummy) 0.002 1.3 0.003 ** 1.3 0.001 1.3 0.002 ** 1.3
1.6 2.3 1.4 2.2
Transition-year (dummy) 0.004 ** 1.1 0.003 1.1 0.002 ** 1.1 0.002 1.1
2.3 1.3 2.1 1.6
SOX (dummy) -0.002 3.0 -0.004 2.7 -0.001 3.0 -0.002 2.7
-0.9 -1.9 -1.0 -1.4
SOX (dummy) /  (IPO Proceeds) 0.704 *** 3.0 0.795 *** 3.0 0.614 *** 3.0 0.643 *** 3.0
4.1 4.8 5.4 5.7
F-statistic 49.0 51.1 56.4 53.1
R-squared 0.596 0.637 0.518 0.576
Condition Index 21.6 21.3 21.6 21.3
Number of observations 1116 708 1116 708
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D






Notes: Data are collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum database. The sample consists of 1,116 firms that went public between 1998 
and 2007. The matched sample consists of 708 IPOs over the same time period. IPO proceeds equal the amount of money raised in the 
IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 millions of dollars. Assets before the IPO equal the total assets of the firm before the IPO, in year 
2000 millions of dollars. Age of the IPO firm is the difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. Ratio of prima-
ry shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares issued. NASDAQ is a dummy variable indicating IPOs that went public on 
the NASDAQ stock exchange. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a high-technology industry are classified as technology firms. 
Underwriter rank is a measure of the quality of the underwriter, with the minimum rank being zero and the maximum being nine, 
according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures of the Carter and Manaster rankings. Transition-year is a dummy variable set 
to 1 in case of the IPO taking place in 2002. SOX is a dummy variable set to 1 in case of the IPO taking place after 2002. White het-
eroskedasticity robust t-statistics are shown in italics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level. Condition Index states the 
highest number of the respective index. 
Assets before the IPO also have a statistically signifi-
cant negative impact on the direct costs of going 
public. However, the effect is rather insignificant 
from an economic point of view. Notably, the age of 
a company does have a negative impact on the costs 
of going public. NASDAQ IPOs apparently do not 
face costs different from NYSE IPOs, the same 
seems to be true for high-technology firms, for 
which the regression does not report any effect at 
all. Apparently, industry background does not have 
any impact on the direct costs of going public. We 
may therefore assume that our results regarding the 
effect of SOX are not driven by a selection bias 
caused by a change in the mix of IPOs. 
The regression results in Panel B of Table 4 indicate 
that SOX had a very small negative and statistically 
insignificant impact on underwriting fees. The coef-
ficients of the dummy variables for the NASDAQ, 
high-technology, and venture-backed firms, and 
underwriter reputation are statistically significant, 
but economically rather insignificant. Altogether, 
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risk inherent in the IPO has a minor influence on 
the fees charged by the underwriter. This confirms 
the results found in the context of the so-called 7-
percent rule (Hansen 2001). The regression results 
in Panel C and Panel D of Table 4 describe the im-
pact of SOX on the non-underwriting expenses and 
accounting and legal fees. In general, the coeffi-
cients of both models are very similar with regards 
to amplitude and significance. In both models, the 
SOX dummy documents a statistically significant 
positive coefficient of 89 and 80 bp, respectively. 
We may therefore conclude that the increase in 
costs is almost exclusively driven by an increase in 
accounting and legal fees. The earlier reported im-
pact of company age and ratio of primary shares on 
the direct costs can also be traced back to account-
ing and legal fees. Regarding company age for which 
we report a negative coefficient, we assume that 
older companies have a better developed accounting 
infrastructure and, therefore, have to pay slightly 
lower accounting and legal fees. Regarding the ratio 
of primary shares, which positively impacts ac-
counting and legal fees, an interpretation is not that 
obvious. The transition dummy, which is set to 1 in 
2002, reports a positive coefficient, which is signifi-
cantly lower than the coefficient reported by the 
SOX dummy. It may thus be concluded that some, 
but not all companies going public in 2002 have 
been SOX-compliant already. 
Table 5 reports the regression results for a specific 
model – we add an additional explanatory variable, 
which captures the interaction between the inverse 
of gross proceeds and the SOX dummy, for the 
whole and a matched sample. The reason for em-
ploying a matched sample is to rule out that our 
results are driven by self-selection. If SOX has had a 
differential impact on the propensity to go public on 
non-listed firms, for instance depending on size or 
other firm-specific characteristics, a change in aver-
age direct costs might result. In order to address this 
issue, one would have to answer the question as to 
what would have been the direct costs of post-SOX 
IPOs if they had gone public in the pre-SOX era. 
Hence, we are in search of counterfactual evidence. 
It is known from the literature (Caliendo and Ko-
peinig 2008) that propensity score matching (PSM) 
is one method of addressing this problem. In order 
to implement this approach, we divide the whole 
sample into a treated (post-SOX IPOs) and an un-
treated (pre-SOX IPOs) group. For each IPO obser-
vation, we calculate a propensity score on the basis 
of the proceeds raised, assets before the IPO, and 
company age. It should be noted that including firm 
assets as an additional variable in the PSM does not 
alter the results. This is not surprising, as firm assets 
are highly correlated with IPO proceeds. For lack of 
space, we do not report this result in the paper. Af-
ter that, each observation in the post-SOX sample is 
matched with the nearest neighbor within the pre-
SOX sample. We allowed pre-SOX IPOs to be a 
nearest neighbor more than once. 
The models in Panel A (whole sample) and Panel B 
(matched sample) of Table 5 use the non-
underwriting fees as the dependent variable. The 
regression results for the matched sample are basi-
cally the same as for the whole sample. We can, 
thus, rule out that our findings are driven by a selec-
tion bias. Furthermore, the reported coefficients are 
in line with the ones reported for the base model in 
Table 4. Only the SOX dummy variable is no longer 
statistically significant. Meanwhile, the interaction 
term (SOX / IPO Proceeds) reports a statistically 
significant coefficient of approximately 0.70, respec-
tively 0.80. The impact of SOX on the direct costs, 
therefore, is not constant, but strongly size-
dependent. According to our results, SOX has an 
impact on fixed non-underwriting costs. Hence, in 
line with what we have expected, small offerings in 
particular, appear to be affected by the introduction 
of SOX. 
The models in Panel C (whole sample) and Panel D 
(matched sample) of Table 5 use the accounting and 
legal fees as the dependent variable. The results are 
basically unchanged. The impact of SOX on ac-
counting and legal fees is again size-dependent, with 
small offerings being most affected by the introduc-
tion of SOX. Moreover, as the coefficients for the 
SOX variables are almost unchanged, it can be de-
duced, once again, that the cost impact of SOX is 
almost entirely channeled via its impact on legal and 
accounting fees. As a difference, it should be pointed 
out that company age no longer has an impact on 
accounting and legal fees. One explanation for this 
finding might be that the average age of companies 
going public has been significantly higher after the 
introduction of SOX. Consequently, the results ob-
tained for age in Table 4 might be driven by a 
change in the composition of the IPO market. Be-
cause of the general insignificance of age from an 
economic point of view and while not being the 
focus of this paper, we will not look more deeply 
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As a final robustness test, we modify the regression 
models tested earlier by substituting the SOX dum-
my variable by annual dummy variables for the 
years from 2003 to 2007. By these means, we are 
able to determine whether the observed impact is 
constant over time. This is what one would expect if 
SOX has had a structural impact on the costs of 
going public. We additionally include a year dummy 
for 2002, as we have seen earlier that a fraction of 
IPOs going public in 2002 have apparently already 
been SOX-compliant. The regression results are 
reported in Table 6. 
In Panel A, we analyze IPO non-underwriting fees. 
The coefficients of the annual dummies are in line 
with our prediction of a permanent structural break 
after the introduction of SOX. For all post-SOX 
years, the coefficients are positive and highly signifi-
cant. For 2002 and 2003, the coefficients are signif-
icant, but lower than in the subsequent years. As 
SOX was passed on July 25, 2002, it was not appli-
cable to all IPOs that take place in that year. To 
some extent, this might also be true for some of the 
IPOs having taken place in 2003, as the IPO process 
often starts more than a year before the actual IPO. 
As there has been a transition period during which 
the implementation of SOX was not mandatory, it 
may well be that many of the offerings in 2002 and 
2003 were not compliant with SOX as well. The 
regression analysis of accounting and legal fees in 
Panel B provides similar results, with all annual 
dummies from 2003 to 2007 being positive and 
significant. 
Finally, by using a simple linear regression model 
where we explain costs by size, a dummy variable 
indicating the SOX period, and an interaction term 
of both variables (SOX / IPO Proceeds), we pro-
duced point estimations for the impact of SOX on 
different cost items for different offering sizes. The 
results are not reported in detail. However, it turned 
out that for a $20 million offering, the direct costs of 
going public increased by about 16 to 24 percent. 
This increase is caused by accounting and legal fees, 
which almost double to 5.9 percent of gross pro-
ceeds. A $100 million offering still faces a total di-
r e c t  c o s t  i n c r e a s e  o f  a b o u t  5  p e r c e n t  o r  4 0  b p  o f 
gross proceeds. For offerings with an issue size be-
yond $250 million, the impact of SOX on the costs 
of going public vanishes. Looking at the dollar im-
pact of SOX, we find that up to an offering size of 
$100 million, the additional cost caused by SOX is 
quite stable and close to $0.5 million. For larger 
issues, however, the dollar impact becomes smaller, 
indicating that from a pure cost perspective, larger 
IPOs were not significantly affected by SOX. One 
could conclude that from an auditing point of view, 
SOX brought about auditing efforts for small offer-
ings adapted to the efforts made already in large 
offerings, which is further evidence in favor of the 
notion that SOX has helped to improve information 
quality and auditing standards in at least a substan-
tial fraction of all IPOs. 
Table 6: Regression Analysis of non-under-
writing fees and accounting and legal fees 




1 / (IPO Proceeds) 1.175 *** 0.643 *** 1.5 
14.3 12.6
Assets before IPO 0.000 0.000 1.2 
-1.5 -1.5
LN(AGE) -0.001 * -0.001 ** 1.3 
-1.7 -2.0
Ratio of Primary Shares 0.007 *** 0.005 *** 1.2 
4.4 4.2
NASDAQ (dummy) -0.002 * 0.000 1.7 
-1.7 0.0
Technology firm (dummy) -0.001 0.000 1.2 
-0.6 -0.5
Venture-backing (dummy) -0.002 ** -0.001 * 1.4 
-2.1 -1.8
Underwriter rank (dummy) 0.001 0.001 1.3 
0.9 0.6
Y2002 (dummy) 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 1.1 
3.2 3.3
Y2003 (dummy) 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 1.1 
3.2 4.4
Y2004 (dummy) 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 1.1 
6.1 7.7
Y2005 (dummy) 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 1.1 
4.3 5.8
Y2006 (dummy) 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 1.1 
5.9 6.3
Y2007 (dummy) 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 1.1 
5.9 6.9
F-statistic 34.4 29.5
Condition Index 20.8 20.8
r-squared 0.563 0.459








Notes: Data are collected from Thomson’s SDC platinum data-
base. The sample consists of 1,116 firms that went public between 
1998 and 2007. IPO proceeds equal the amount of money raised 
in the IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 millions of dollars. 
Assets before the IPO equal the total assets of the firm before the 
IPO, in year 2000 millions of dollars. Age of the IPO firm is the 
difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in 
years. Ratio of primary shares denotes the ratio of primary 
shares to all shares issued. NASDAQ is a dummy variable indi-
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Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a high-technology indus-
try are classified as technology firms. Underwriter rank is a 
measure of the quality of the underwriter, with the minimum 
rank being zero and the maximum being nine, according to 
Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures of the Carter and 
Manaster rankings. The year variables 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, and 2007 are dummy variables set to 1 in the respective 
year. White heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are shown in 
italics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. 
Condition Index states the highest number of the respective 
index. 
5.2  Analysis of the indirect costs 
5.2.1  Descriptive statistics 
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics on IPOs taking 
place during the pre-SOX (Panel B) and post-SOX 
(Panel A) periods. Before the introduction of SOX, 
offer prices have been adjusted by, on average, 3.0 
percent. After the introduction, offer prices have 
been adjusted by, on average, -2.8 percent, which 
represents a statistically significant shift downwards 
from the pre- to post-SOX period by about 6 pp. 
Adjustments to the offer price, meaning that the 
issue is not priced at the midpoint of the initially 
filed bookbuilding range, occur in 87.7 percent 
(post-SOX) and 85.1 percent (pre-SOX) of all IPOs 
recorded in the sample. The difference between the 
post and pre-SOX period is insignificant from a 
statistical point of view. Range revisions, both up 
and downwards have, however, decreased signifi-
cantly after the introduction of SOX. This finding is 
in line with our view that SOX has improved the 
precision of the initial pricing done by the under-
writer. 
The descriptive statistics on underpricing further 
support our main hypotheses. On average, under-
pricing has decreased significantly by more than 50 
percent after the introduction of SOX. Also, the 
median underpricing has decreased significantly by 
25 percent. 
While underpricing was substantially higher and 
more volatile before the introduction of SOX, IPO 
size measured by proceeds or firm assets was signif-
icantly lower. These findings are in line with the 
widespread perception that because of the increase 
in compliance costs, there was a stronger decrease 
in the propensity to go public for smaller firms as 
compared to larger firms. Any analysis has to there-
fore control for the impact of size (and other firm-
specific characteristics) on offer price adjustments 
and underpricing. 
Notably, the median underwriter rank has increased 
from 8 to 9, indicating that many low-reputation 
underwriters have been driven out of the market 
after the enactment of SOX. The average age of 
companies going public has also increased from 13.7 
to 20.9 years. Again, the increase is not that strong 
when comparing medians. Furthermore, we observe 
a decrease in share overhang after the introduction 
of SOX. 
5.2.2  Regression analysis of offer price adjust-
ments and underpricing 
It is known from the underpricing literature that 
IPO pricing is influenced by several factors, with 
market sentiment (hot issue markets) and firm 
characteristics amongst them. Hence, in order to 
test whether the enactment of SOX had an autono-
mous impact on offer price adjustments and under-
pricing, it is necessary to control for these factors. In 
a first step, we therefore apply an OLS analysis, 
where we use the natural logarithm of gross pro-
ceeds (in million $ and measured in prices of the 
year 2000), the natural logarithm of the company’s 
age, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO had a 
lead underwriter with a Carter-Manaster rating of at 
least 8 (the rating of Carter and Manaster (1990) 
ranks the reputation of banks on a discrete scale 
from zero to nine), dummy variables indicating 
whether the issue has been backed by venture capi-
tal, whether the issue has been a spin-off, whether 
the issue is classified as a high-tech firm, and 
whether the issue is classified as an Internet firm, as 
independent variables. Further control variables are 
the ratio of primary shares to all shares issued in an 
IPO, the lagged return over 30 trading days on the 
NASDAQ, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO 
took place in 1999 or 2000, and the average under-
pricing of the previous quarter. In order to reveal 
the impact of SOX on the pricing of IPOs, we in-
clude a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO took 
place after 2002 (SOX dummy) and 0 otherwise. To 
test the robustness of our regression results, we 
furthermore add the natural logarithm of assets 
prior to the IPO and the share overhang as inde-
pendent variables. 
Table 8 reports regression results explaining IPO 
pricing during the period ranging from 1990 to 
2007. Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity, the 
t-statistics are calculated in accordance with White’s 
(1980) method for the approximate estimator for BuR - Business Research 
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Table 7: Comparison of the Pre- and Post-SOX periods 
N Mean Median N Mean Median
Offer Price adjustment 505 -2.8% 0.0% 3469 3.0% *** 0.0% ***
Adjustments upwards only 219 14.2% 11.1% 1596 21.8% *** 14.3% ***
Adjustment downwards only 224 -20.2% -17.9% 1355 -17.9% *** -15.4% ***
% Offer Price adjusted 87.7% 85.1%
% Range revised up 9.0% 22.4% ***
% Range revised down 10.6% 17.0% ***
Underpricing 509 12.2% 7.5% 3473 26.7% *** 10.0% ***
Underpricing (only) 366 18.7% 13.8% 2660 36.2% *** 17.2% ***
Overpricing (only) 108 -6.2% -3.9% 368 -9.8% ** -5.0% ***
IPO proceeds (2000 $mil) 509 141.81 83.81 3473 82.12 *** 42.87 ***
Assets before IPO (2000 $mil) 442 475.96 100.01 2728 212.00 *** 35.48 ***
Overhang 509 2.94 2.69 2652 3.67 ** 2.50
Underwriter Rank 509 8.31 9.00 3473 7.54 *** 8.00 ***
Ratio of Primary Shares 509 0.88 1.00 3473 0.92 *** 1.00 ***
Age of IPO firm 509 20.93 9.00 3473 13.73 *** 7.00 ***
% Venture Capital Backed 47.9% 47.0%
% Spinoffs 1.0% 7.1% ***
% Internet Firms 5.3% 2.3% ***
% Technology Firms 24.2% 30.1% ***
Panel A Panel B
IPOs post SOX IPOs pre SOX
 
Note: The sample consists of 3,982 firms that went public between 1990 and 2007. Offer price adjustment is the percentage change 
between the midpoint of the initially filed book range and the offer price. Underpricing equals the percentage change between the offer 
price and the first trading day closing price. IPO proceeds equal the amount of money raised in the IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 
millions of dollars. Overhang is defined as Pre-IPO shares retained divided by shares issued in the IPO, where Pre-IPO shares retained
represent shares owned by pre-IPO shareholders that are not sold in the offering. Assets equal firm assets prior to the IPO, in year 
2000 millions of dollars. Underwriter rank is a measure of the quality of the underwriter, with the minimum rank being zero and the 
maximum being nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures of the Carter and Manaster rankings. Ratio of primary 
shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares emitted. Age of the IPO firm is the difference between the founding and issuing 
dates, denoted in years. Percent NASDAQ resp. percentage venture capital backed equals the percent of IPOs that were listed at 
NASDAQ resp. backed by venture capitalists before the IPO. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a high-tech industry are classified 
as technology firms. . Firms that, according to SDC provide Internet Services and Software are classified as internet firms. Percentage 
IPOs of Technology Firms gives the percentage of these firms in the sample. Asterisks denote significance differences between the two 
samples, based on t-statistics for means and Mann-Whitney-statistics for medians: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels. 
 
the variance of the least-squares estimator. Moreo-
ver, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is below 5 for 
all variables, indicating that the estimation may not 
be subject to multicollinearity problems. 
Table 8 uses four different regression models. In 
model 1, the relative adjustment of the offer price 
with respect to the midpoint of the initially filed 
bookbuilding range is used as the dependent varia-
ble. In this setup, the SOX dummy coefficient is 
significantly negative. According to the model, the 
expected offer price adjustment is lower by 7.4 pp 
after the enactment of SOX. This finding supports 
our hypothesis that because of the reduction in the 
degree of asymmetric information, SOX should have 
had a negative impact on the offer price adjust-
ments. Notably, we use several control variables in 
order to sort out the impact of the hot technology 
market, especially during the internet bubble, and 
the impact of market sentiment more generally. 
Actually, the technology firm dummy, the NASDAQ 
return over the 30-day period before the IPO, the 
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Table 8: Basic regression analysis of price adjustments and underpricing 
Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF
Intercept -0.194 *** -0.026 0.160 *** -0.451 ***
-7.1 -0.5 3.8 -4.6
Ln(IPO Proceeds) 0.071 *** 1.6 0.024 *** 1.6 -0.044 *** 1.7 0.141 *** 1.6
13.8 2.5 -5.0 7.1
Ln(1 + Age of IPO Firm) -0.020 *** 1.1 -0.034 *** 1.1 -0.016 *** 1.1 -0.074 *** 1.1
-5.7 -5.3 -2.6 -6.5
Underwr. Reputation (dummy) -0.018 ** 1.5 0.043 *** 1.5 0.060 *** 1.5 0.023 1.5
-2.1 2.6 3.9 0.8
Ratio of Primary Shares -0.087 *** 1.1 0.039 1.1 0.122 *** 1.1 0.003 1.1
-4.5 1.3 4.2 0.1
VC-backed (dummy) 0.022 *** 1.2 0.041 *** 1.2 0.020 1.2 0.108 *** 1.2
3.1 2.6 1.4 4.0
Spinoff (dummy) -0.025 * 1.0 -0.051 ** 1.0 -0.027 -0.082 * 1.0
-1.8 -2.2 -1.3 -1.9
Technology firm (dummy) 0.088 *** 1.2 0.141 *** 1.2 0.056 *** 1.2 0.292 *** 1.2
9.9 6.8 2.9 7.7
Internet firm (dummy) 0.030 1.1 0.244 1.1 0.215 ** 1.1 0.432 * 1.1
0.9 2.3 2.3 2.0
30-day Nasdaq return 0.811 *** 1.0 1.294 *** 1.0 0.520 *** 1.1 2.932 *** 1.0
12.8 8.9 4.2 8.6
1999 or 2000 year dummy 0.053 ** 4.2 0.325 *** 4.2 0.274 *** 4.2 0.512 *** 4.2
2.3 5.7 5.6 4.5
SOX-Dummy (2003 - 2007) -0.074 *** 1.2 -0.056 *** 1.2 0.015 1.2 -0.163 *** 1.2
-7.7 -4.3 1.1 -6.5
offer price adjustment 0.960 *** 1.3
15.3
underpricing previous quarter 0.081 ** 4.2 0.185 ** 4.2 0.106 4.2 0.455 ** 4.2
2.1 2.0 1.4 2.4
Number of observations 3955 3963 3955 3955
Condition Index 25.73 25.73 25.55 25.73
R-squared 23.41% 22.14% 37.00% 23.95%
Offer price 
adjustment Underpricing Underpricing
Midpoint to    
Closing price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Note: The sample consists of firms that went public between 1990 and 2007. Offer price adjustment is the percentage change between 
the midpoint of the initially filed book range and the offer price. Underpricing equals the percentage change between the offer price and 
the first trading day closing price. 30-day Nasdaq return is the lagged return on the NASDAQ Index over the previous 30 trading days. 
Underpricing previous quarter denotes the average underpricing of the previous quarter. IPO proceeds equal the amount of money 
raised in the IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 millions of dollars. Underwriter rank is a measure of the quality of the underwriter, 
with the minimum rank being zero and the maximum being nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures of the Carter 
and Manaster rankings. Ratio of primary shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares emitted. Age of the IPO firm is the 
difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. VC-backed is a dummy variable that is set to in 1 in case that the 
IPO was backed by venture capitalists. We rely on SDC to determine whether an offering was a spinoff. Firms that SDC defines as 
belonging to a high-tech industry are classified as technology firms. Firms that according to SDC provide Internet Services and Soft-
ware are classified as internet firms. White heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are shown in italics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1, 5, and 10% levels. Condition Index states the highest number of the respective index. 
 
underpricing in the previous quarter turn out to 
have a significant positive influence on the offer 
price adjustment. 
Model (2) in Table 8 reports the regression results 
with the underpricing as the dependent variable. 
Again, the SOX dummy is highly significant and 
negative. According to the regression results, un-
derpricing has decreased by 5.6 pp after the intro-
duction of SOX. This finding is in line with our hy-
pothesis that SOX has decreased asymmetric infor-
mation, which in turn is rewarded by lower levels of 
underpricing. 
Again, we control for the impact of hot market peri-
ods on the underpricing. We find both the average 
underpricing of the previous quarter and the lagged 
30-day return to have a strongly positive, highly 
significant impact on the underpricing of an IPO. 
Moreover, in accordance with the literature (Titman 
and Trueman 1986, Carter and Manaster 1990, 
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of the underwriter to have a positive and significant 
impact on underpricing. This finding is particularly 
interesting when combining it with the coefficient in 
model (1). There, the impact of reputation on price 
adjustments is negative. While not being the focus 
of this paper, it appears as if high-reputable under-
writers adjust less and, therefore, allow more un-
derpricing. In this sense, these results are in line 
with the hypothesis that highly reputable under-
writers use underpricing as part of their compensa-
tion package. 
Table 8 also reports the regression results for model 
(3) where the underpricing is used again as the de-
pendent variable. In this model, however, we in-
clude the offer price adjustment as an explanatory 
variable into the regression model. As expected, the 
explanatory power of the model strongly increases 
from 22 percent to 37 percent as a consequence of 
the fact that the offer price adjustment is a strong 
predictor for the underpricing of an IPO. It should 
be noted that the coefficient of the SOX dummy is 
now close to zero. Apparently, the reduction in un-
derpricing after the introduction of SOX can be fully 
explained by the offer price adjustment. From the 
results of model (1), we know that the offer price 
adjustment has decreased significantly by 7.4 pp 
after the introduction of SOX. This is in line with 
our hypothesis that the post-SOX reduction in un-
derpricing is caused by a lower offer price adjust-
ment, which in turn is the consequence of reduced 
asymmetric information. According to the coeffi-
cient, which is equal to 0.96, an increase in the offer 
price adjustments by 1 pp should result in an in-
crease of underpricing by about the same amount. 
Hence, the post-SOX reduction in underpricing of 
5.6 pp found in model (2) can be split up in a reduc-
tion due to a reduced offer price adjustment (-7.4 pp 
x 0.96 = -7.1 pp) and an otherwise increased under-
pricing of 1.5 pp.  
Model (4) in Table 8 reports the regression results 
with the relative distance of the midpoint of the 
bookbuilding range to the closing price on the first 
trading day as the dependent variable. Here, the 
model reports a statistically significant SOX coeffi-
cient equal to -16.3 percent, which is basically the 
combined effect of the reduction in the offer price 
adjustment plus its impact on the underpricing. 
It should be noted that regression results reported 
in Table 8 remain almost unchanged for different 
model specifications. For instance, adding the natu-
ral logarithm of assets or the share overhang into 
the model has no material impact on the results. 
The same is true if the IPOs of the bubble years 1999 
and 2000 are excluded from the regression analysis. 
In this latter case, the coefficient of the SOX dummy 
in model (2) of Table 8 changes from -5.6 to -3.4 
percent; nevertheless, it is still significant at the 1-
percent level. For lack of space we do not report 
these robustness checks here. 
5.2.3  Addressing the self-selection bias 
Of course, it could be argued against our results that 
they might be driven by self-selection. If SOX has 
had a differential impact on the propensity to go 
public on non-listed firms, for instance depending 
on size or other firm-specific characteristics, a 
change in average underpricing might result. Hence, 
it cannot be ruled out that such a change is com-
pletely unrelated to any variation in asymmetric 
information. In order to address this issue, one 
would have to answer the question as to what would 
have been the underpricing of post-SOX IPOs, if 
they had gone public in the pre-SOX era. Hence, we 
apply the same propensity score matching (PSM) 
approach as introduced in section 5.1.2. In this way, 
a matching firm sample was constructed consisting 
of 505 pre-SOX and post-SOX IPOs, i.e. a total of 
1010 observations. Note that the 505 pre-SOX ob-
servations consist of 407 different IPOs. 
Regression results presented in Table 9 were re-
estimated on the basis of this matching firm sample. 
Roughly speaking, it could be said that results – in 
terms of magnitude and significance – are almost 
unchanged with respect to those presented in Table 
8. This is especially true for the SOX dummy coeffi-
cients as well as for the offer price adjustment coef-
ficient. After all, these results corroborate the asser-
tion that our earlier findings are not driven by self-
selection, i.e. by a change in the characteristics of 
IPOs that is unrelated to their exposure towards 
asymmetric information problems. 
5.2.4  Other robustness tests 
In order to provide additional evidence in favor of 
our main hypothesis that SOX provided an effective 
mechanism to reduce asymmetric information for 
firms going public, we present two additional tests. 
The first test starts from the idea that the marginal 
gain from reducing asymmetric information should 
be higher for those firms that have more difficulties 
in providing transparent and reliable information to 
the market. Typically, this should be true for young-BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of VHB 
German Academic Association for Business Research (VHB) 
Volume 4 | Issue 2 | December 2011 | 125-147 
141 
er firms with higher growth rates and less developed 
product markets. We capture this idea by splitting 
up the SOX dummy according to age and listing   
location. For the latter approach, we start from the 
admittedly unsophisticated hypothesis that, cum 
grano salis, the asymmetric information problems 
should typically be higher for firms addressing a 
NASDAQ listing instead of listing on the NYSE. The 
results of this regression analysis are reported in 
Table 10. 
In models (1) and (2), we replace the SOX dummy 
with two interaction terms depending on whether 
the issue took place at NYSE or NASDAQ. Accord-
ing to our reasoning presented above, the under-
pricing of NASDAQ IPOs should be more affected 
by the enactment of SOX than the underpricing of 
NYSE IPOs. Furthermore, because listing require-
ments also work as a screening mechanism, the 
universe of companies going public is different on 
the NASDAQ versus NYSE. 
Table 9: Matched sample regression analysis of price adjustments and underpricing 
Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF
Intercept -0.226 *** 0.011 0.218 -0.483 *
-3.6 0.1 1.5 -1.8
Ln(IPO Proceeds) 0.080 *** 1.5 0.045 ** 1.5 -0.036 ** 1.6 0.183 *** 1.5
7.5 2.3 -2.1 4.1
Ln(1 + Age of IPO Firm) -0.018 *** 1.2 -0.022 ** 1.2 0.002 1.2 -0.059 ** 1.2
-2.9 -2.0 0.2 -2.5
Underwriter Reputation (dummy) -0.049 *** 1.3 -0.081 1.3 -0.039 1.3 -0.170 ** 1.3
-2.7 -1.6 -0.8 -2.1
Ratio of Primary Shares -0.096 *** 1.1 -0.042 1.1 0.076 1.1 -0.083 1.1
-3.1 -0.6 1.1 -0.8
VC-backed (dummy) 0.052 *** 1.3 0.097 *** 1.3 0.043 1.3 0.233 *** 1.3
3.2 2.9 1.5 3.2
Spinoff (dummy) -0.031 1.1 -0.074 1.1 -0.041 1.1 -0.129 1.1
-0.9 -1.6 -1.1 -1.1
Technology firm (dummy) 0.113 *** 1.3 0.191 *** 1.3 0.079 1.3 0.346 *** 1.3
5.2 3.3 1.4 3.1
Internet firm (dummy) -0.042 1.2 0.054 1.2 0.124 1.2 0.021 1.2
-1.1 0.4 0.9 0.1
30-day Nasdaq return 1.096 *** 1.1 1.238 *** 1.1 0.071 1.2 3.910 *** 1.1
6.4 3.4 0.3 3.4
1999 or 2000 year dummy 0.083 5.1 0.513 *** 5.1 0.440 *** 5.1 1.053 ** 5.1
1.3 2.8 3.0 2.3
SOX-Dummy (2003 - 2007) -0.069 *** 1.3 -0.056 ** 1.3 0.016 1.3 -0.150 *** 1.3
-4.8 -2.0 0.5 -3.3
Offer price adjustment 1.044 *** 1.4
7.9
Underpricing previous quarter 0.058 5.4 0.032 5.4 -0.070 5.4 0.071 5.4
0.6 0.1 -0.3 0.1
Number of observations 1010 1010 1010 1010
Condition index 28.31 28.31 28.59 28.31
R-squared 27.90% 23.28% 41.42% 24.15%




Midpoint to    Closing 
price
 
Note: The sample consists of firms that went public between 1990 and 2007. Each IPO that has taken place after the introduction of 
SOX has been matched with its nearest neighbor out of the pre-SOX period. Matching has taken place on the basis of a propensity score 
which was calculated using industry background, proceeds raised, and age of the company as selection variables. Offer price adjust-
ment is the percentage change between the midpoint of the initially filed book range and the offer price. Underpricing equals the per-
centage change between the offer price and the first trading day closing price. IPO proceeds equal the amount of money raised in the 
IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 millions of dollars. Underwriter rank is a measure of the quality of the underwriter, with the mini-
mum rank being zero and the maximum being nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures of the Carter and Manaster 
rankings. Ratio of primary shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares emitted. Age of the IPO firm is the difference be-
tween the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. VC-backed is a dummy variable that is set to in 1 in case that the IPO was 
backed by venture capitalists. We rely on SDC to determine whether an offering was a spinoff. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a 
high-tech industry are classified as technology firms. Firms that according to SDC provide Internet Services and Software are classified 
as internet firms. 30-day Nasdaq return is the lagged return on the NASDAQ Index over the previous 30 trading days. Underpricing 
previous quarter denotes the average underpricing of the previous quarter. All other variables are defined in Table 1. White heteroske-
dasticity robust t-statistics are shown in italics. Asterisks denote significance differences to zero based on t-statistics: ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. Condition Index states the highest number of the respective index. BuR - Business Research 
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By separating IPOs according to these listing ven-
ues, it is thus possible to isolate those companies 
that are more likely to benefit from SOX. A closer 
look at the estimates of models (1) and (2) reveals 
that the effect of SOX on underpricing is, in fact, 
different between NYSE and NASDAQ IPOs. While 
we do not find a significant effect of SOX on the 
offer price adjustment as well as on the underpric-
ing of NYSE IPOs, the effect of SOX is significantly 
negative in both cases for NASDAQ IPOs. This find-
ing provides further evidence for a reduction in 
information asymmetries driving the reduction in 
underpricing. Furthermore, earlier findings in this 
paper show that underpricing is different depending 
on the age of the company. This finding is generally 
explained by outlining that younger companies are 
generally associated with higher uncertainty con-
cerning their true value (Ritter 1984, Carter and 
Manaster 1990, Megginson and Weiss 1991, and 
Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998). Therefore, SOX 
should have a substantial impact on the underpric-
ing of young companies in particular. Consequently, 
we include two further interaction terms between 
SOX and age in models (3) and (4). As expected, the 
SOX effect is lower for older companies on both the 
offer price adjustment as well as the underpricing. 
Again, we find this to be further evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis that SOX has led to a reduction in 
underpricing. 
As a final robustness test, we try to address another 
potential criticism against the interpretation of our 
results. It is well known that the introduction of 
SOX went along with a difficult period for global 
capital markets. The upcoming economic downturn, 
the 9/11 attacks, and the increased stock market 
volatility, are just a few symptoms of the difficult 
period markets have been facing during the years 
2001 to 2003. Hence, it may well be that our results 
are driven by such a fundamental uncertainty in 
market prospects and/or a stark shift in market 
sentiment (Leuz 2007). However, if this argument is 
relevant, we would expect only a temporary impact 
on IPO markets, while our hypothesis predicts a 
permanent impact. Consequently, we modify the 
regression models tested in Table 8 by substituting 
the SOX dummy variable by annual dummy varia-
bles for the years 2003 to 2007. We additionally 
include a year dummy for 2002 in order to deter-
mine whether there has been a structural break after 
2002 or after the bubble burst in 2000 or 2001. The 
regression results are reported in Table 11. 
In model (1), we again analyze IPO offer price ad-
justments. The coefficients of the annual dummies 
are in line with our prediction of a permanent struc-
tural break after the introduction of SOX. For the 
years 2004 to 2007, the coefficients are negative 
and highly significant. For 2002 and 2003, the coef-
ficients are not significant. The insignificance of the 
2003 dummy can well be explained by the fact that 
while offerings have taken place in 2003, the indica-
tive bookbuilding range in many cases might have 
already been filed in 2002, i.e. when SOX had not 
yet been applicable. The regression analysis of un-
derpricing in model (3) provides similar results, as 
all annual dummies from 2003 to 2007 are negative 
and significant, while the dummy for 2002 is posi-
tive and insignificant. Findings, therefore, suggest 
that the structural break in underpricing took place 
in 2003 and not earlier. Estimations of models (1) 
and (3) are repeated in models (2) and (4) on the 
basis of the matched sample. As far as the impact of 
SOX on the offer price adjustment is concerned, 
results remain extremely stable. Unfortunately, as 
far as the impact on underpricing is concerned, we 
find the coefficients to have similar magnitude, 
although they lose their significance in some cases. 
As a final remark, it should be noted that according 
to model (5), it turns out again that the structural 
break caused by SOX can be explained via its impact 
on the offer price adjustment. 
6  Conclusion 
This paper examined the impact of the introduction 
of SOX on the cost of going public. Three main hy-
potheses were tested: (1) According to ample evi-
dence in the literature, we expected direct costs to 
significantly increase, mostly due to an increase in 
accounting and legal fees because of increased 
transparency and compliance standards. (2) We 
regard SOX as a mechanism to reduce asymmetric 
information between underwriters and institutional 
investors. Therefore, we expect the offer price ad-
justments to be lower after the introduction of SOX; 
and (3) if more information is available, then the 
information provided by institutional investors 
should be less costly. As a consequence, underpric-
ing should have decreased after the introduction of 
SOX. 
First, our results show that direct flotation costs 
increase by a highly significant 90 bp of gross pro-
ceeds. BuR - Business Research 
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Table 10: Regression analysis of price adjustments and underpricing with information-
related interaction terms 
Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF
Intercept -0.314 *** -0.163 *** -0.193 *** 0.0
-9.5 -2.8 -7.0 -0.420
Ln(IPO Proceeds) 0.082 *** 1.8 0.036 *** 1.8 0.071 *** 1.6 0.0 *** 1.6
14.4 3.3 13.8 -5.470
Ln(1 + Age of IPO Firm) -0.018 *** 1.1 -0.033 *** 1.1 -0.020 *** 1.2 0.0 ** 1.2
-5.3 -5.1 -5.6 2.490
Underwriter Reputation (dummy) -0.016 * 1.5 0.045 *** 1.5 -0.018 ** 1.5 0.043 *** 1.5
-1.9 2.7 -2.2 2.6
Ratio of Primary Shares -0.076 *** 1.1 0.052 * 1.1 -0.086 *** 1.1 0.042 1.1
-4.0 1.7 -4.4 1.4
VC-backed (dummy) 0.013 * 1.3 0.031 ** 1.3 0.023 *** 1.3 0.043 *** 1.3
1.8 2.0 3.1 2.7
Spinoff (dummy) -0.021 1.0 -0.046 ** 1.0 -0.025 * 1.0 -0.050 ** 1.0
-1.5 -2.0 -1.7 -2.2
Technology firm (dummy) 0.082 *** 1.2 0.133 *** 1.2 0.088 *** 1.2 0.140 *** 1.2
9.2 6.5 9.9 6.8
Internet firm (dummy) 0.030 1.1 0.246 ** 1.1 0.031 1.1 0.249 ** 1.1
0.9 2.4 0.9 2.4
30-day Nasdaq return 0.781 *** 1.0 1.260 *** 1.0 0.810 *** 1.0 1.290 *** 1.0
12.3 8.7 12.8 8.9
1999 or 2000 year dummy 0.044 4.2 0.314 *** 4.2 0.053 ** 4.2 0.323 *** 4.2
1.9 5.5 2.3 5.7
NASDAQ (dummy) 0.085 *** 1.6 0.099 *** 1.6
8.0 5.3
-0.093 *** 1.2 -0.080 *** 1.2
-8.2 -5.2
-0.027 1.3 0.014 1.3
-1.6 0.7
-0.083 *** 1.1 -0.105 *** 1.1
-5.5 -5.4
-0.067 *** 1.2 -0.024 1.2
-6.0 -1.6
underpricing previous quarter 0.082 ** 4.2 0.186 ** 4.2 0.081 ** 4.2 0.185 ** 4.2
2.1 2.0 2.1 2.0
Number of observations 3955 3963 3955 3963
Condition Index 29.83 29.83 25.38 25.38
R-squared 24.88% 22.44% 23.42% 22.20%
Young Firm  (Age <= 7 years)  * SOX (dummy)
Old Firm  (Age > 7 years)  * SOX (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NASDAQ (dummy)  * SOX (dummy)









Note: The sample consists of IPOS that went public between 1990 and 2007. Offer price adjustment is the percentage change between 
the midpoint of the initially filed book range and the offer price. Underpricing equals the percentage change between the offer price and 
the first trading day closing price. IPO proceeds equal the amount of money raised in the IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 millions of 
dollars. Underwriter rank is a measure of the quality of the underwriter, with the minimum rank being zero and the maximum being 
nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s updated measures of the Carter and Manaster rankings. Ratio of primary shares denotes the 
ratio of primary shares to all shares emitted. Age of the IPO firm is the difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in 
years. VC-backed is a dummy variable that is set to in 1 in case that the IPO was backed by venture capitalists. We rely on SDC to 
determine whether an offering was a spinoff. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a high-tech industry are classified as technology 
firms. Firms that according to SDC provide Internet Services and Software are classified as internet firms. 30-day Nasdaq return is the 
lagged return on the NASDAQ Index over the previous 30 trading days. Underpricing previous quarter denotes the average underpric-
ing of the previous quarter. All other variables are defined in Table 1. White heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are shown in italics. 
Asterisks denote significance differences to zero based on t-statistics: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. Condition 
Index states the highest number of the respective index. 
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Table 11: Regression Analysis of price adjustments and underpricing with annual SOX 
dummy variables 
Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF Coeff. VIF
Intercept -0.195 *** -0.022 0.011 0.2 ***
-7.1 -0.4 0.1 3.840
Ln(IPO Proceeds) 0.072 *** 1.6 0.023 ** 1.6 0.045 ** 1.5 -0.046 *** 1.7
13.7 2.3 2.3 -5.0
Ln(1 + Age of IPO Firm) -0.020 *** 1.1 -0.035 *** 1.1 -0.023 ** 1.2 -0.016 *** 1.1
-5.6 -5.3 -2.0 -2.7
Underwr. Reputation (dummy) -0.018 ** 1.5 0.044 *** 1.5 -0.081 1.3 0.061 *** 1.5
-2.2 2.6 -1.6 4.0
Ratio of Primary Shares -0.086 *** 1.1 0.038 1.1 -0.045 1.1 0.121 *** 1.1
-4.4 1.3 -0.7 4.2
VC-backed (dummy) 0.022 *** 1.2 0.041 *** 1.2 0.098 *** 1.2 0.019 1.2
3.1 2.6 2.9 1.3
Spinoff (dummy) -0.025 * 1.0 -0.050 ** 1.0 -0.074 1.1 -0.026 1.0
-1.8 -2.2 -1.6 -1.3
Technology firm (dummy) 0.088 *** 1.2 0.141 *** 1.2 0.193 *** 1.2 0.056 *** 1.2
9.9 6.8 3.3 2.9
Internet firm (dummy) 0.030 1.1 0.245 ** 1.1 0.052 1.1 0.216 ** 1.1
0.9 2.4 0.4 2.3
30-day Nasdaq return 0.802 *** 1.1 1.313 *** 1.1 1.247 *** 1.1 0.545 *** 1.1
12.5 9.1 3.4 4.5
1999 or 2000 year dummy 0.054 ** 4.2 0.326 *** 4.2 0.511 *** 5.1 0.274 *** 4.2
2.4 5.7 2.8 5.6
Y2002 -0.035 1.0 0.086 1.0 0.047 1.1 0.124 1.0
-1.4 1.1 0.9 1.6
Y2003 -0.018 1.0 -0.059 ** 1.0 -0.069 * 1.1 -0.041 1.0
-0.8 -2.0 -1.7 -1.4
Y2004 -0.093 *** 1.1 -0.038 ** 1.1 -0.046 1.1 0.054 ** 1.1
-5.3 -2.1 -1.4 2.5
Y2005 -0.089 *** 1.1 -0.058 *** 1.1 -0.056 1.1 0.027 1.1
-4.9 -2.6 -1.6 1.4
Y2006 -0.059 *** 1.1 -0.045 ** 1.1 -0.037 1.1 0.012 1.1
-3.6 -2.1 -1.1 0.7
Y2007 -0.076 *** 1.1 -0.075 *** 1.1 -0.079 ** 1.1 -0.002 1.1
-4.4 -3.2 -2.2 -0.1
Offer price adjustment 0.962 *** 1.3
15.3
Underpricing previous quarter 0.079 ** 4.2 0.188 ** 4.2 0.035 5.4 0.111 4.2
2.0 2.0 0.1 1.5
Number of observations 3955 3963 1010 3955
Condition Index 25.42 25.42 28.50 25.61




Note: The sample consists of IPOs that went public between 1990 and 2007. Regression results in column (3) are based on the matched 
sample used in Table 9. Offer price adjustment is the percentage change between the midpoint of the initially filed book range and the 
offer price. Underpricing equals the percentage change between the offer price and the first trading day closing price. IPO proceeds 
equal the amount of money raised in the IPO (excl. greenshoe), in year 2000 millions of dollars. Underwriter rank is a measure of the 
quality of the underwriter, with the minimum rank being zero and the maximum being nine, according to Loughran and Ritter’s up-
dated measures of the Carter and Manaster rankings. Ratio of primary shares denotes the ratio of primary shares to all shares emit-
ted. Age of the IPO firm is the difference between the founding and issuing dates, denoted in years. VC-backed is a dummy variable that 
is set to in 1 in case that the IPO was backed by venture capitalists before. We rely on SDC to determine whether an offering was a 
spinoff. Firms that SDC defines as belonging to a high-tech industry are classified as technology firms. Firms that according to SDC 
provide Internet Services and Software are classified as internet firms. Y2002, Y2003, Y2004, Y2005, Y2006, Y2007 are dummy 
variables coded 1 in the respective year and 0 otherwise. 30-day Nasdaq return is the lagged return on the NASDAQ Index over the 
previous 30 trading days. Underpricing previous quarter denotes the average underpricing of the previous quarter. All other variables 
are defined in Table 1. White heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are shown in italics. Asterisks denote significance differences to zero 
based on t-statistics: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. Condition Index states the highest number of the respective 
index. 
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This increase is almost entirely due to an increase in 
accounting and legal fees. Moreover, this increase is 
to a large extent due to an increase in fixed flotation 
costs. Therefore, smaller firms are by far more heav-
ily affected than larger firms. In fact, we estimate 
that beyond an offering size of $250 millions there 
is no SOX-specific impact on direct flotation costs, 
while up to an offering size of $100 million the addi-
tional cost is relatively stable and equal to 0.5 mil-
lion year 2000 dollars. 
Second, we find strong evidence that the level of 
offer price adjustments has significantly decreased 
after the introduction of SOX. On average, offer 
price adjustment is lower by a statistically signifi-
cant 6 pp in the post-SOX era. Moreover, the book-
building range revisions have also become only as 
half as frequent as in the pre-SOX era. Third, we 
recorded a highly significant reduction in underpric-
ing by 5.6 pp. Moreover, it fits nicely into our rea-
soning that this reduction in underpricing can al-
most entirely be explained by lower adjustments 
made to the offer price. This is a strong indication 
that SOX has decreased the degree of asymmetric 
information between the underwriter and institu-
tional investors. 
All of these results turned out to be robust for differ-
ent alternative model specifications. Most im-
portantly, the same results were obtained after ap-
plying a propensity score matching approach in 
order to control for a potential self-selection bias. In 
this way, we were able to gather counterfactual evi-
dence in the sense that we can estimate what the 
flotation costs or the underpricing of a company 
would have been, if the IPO had been done before 
the introduction of SOX. Notably, we do not find 
any evidence that our results are driven by a selec-
tion bias. Moreover, we can also show that SOX 
enactment in 2002 marked a structural permanent 
shift in the flotation costs as well as the underpric-
ing of IPOs in the US. 
Further research questions may emerge from the 
asymmetric information story presented in this 
paper. For instance, if our assertion is true, we 
would expect SOX to have an impact on long-run 
IPO underperformance. Also, similar effects should 
be found in the reaction to SEO announcements. 
And finally, the direct impact of SOX on the firm’s 
cost of capital is a more general issue that has to be 
further investigated. 
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